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Abstract
Natural disasters have been linked to both violent conict and, in some settings, poor
economic growth, but do they also drive government parties out of o¢ ce? We study gov-
ernment turnover in a global sample of more than 200 elections to the executive. Natural
disasters are associated with more frequent turnover, but not in highly democratic countries.
The e¤ect of geophysical disasters is especially strong, and even stronger when endogeneity
is addressed.
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1 Introduction
That natural disasters can a¤ect electoral outcomes has been understood by practical politicians
for a long time (Abney and Hill 1966), yet this remains an area where little comparative empirical
work has been done. This paper investigates the electoral consequences of natural disasters.
Natural disasters are found to have a positive e¤ect on the probability that the party of the
executive is voted out of o¢ ce.
Why should natural disasters a¤ect voting? In the literature on economic voting, the the-
oretical foundation regularly builds on the reward-punishment model in which an incumbent
is assumed to be reelected when performance has been good, and not otherwise. This theory
is typically borne out by the data (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and
Belénger 2012, Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce 2012).
The reward-punishment model has implications for what to expect in terms of voting be-
havior after a natural disaster. Natural disasters are caused by natural hazards but become
actual disasters only where social, economic, and political factors allow it (Kahn 2004, Ström-
berg 2007, Toya and Skidmore 2007). The e¤ects of natural disaster on economic growth is
debated, with ndings ranging from negative to positive, depending on sample and estimation
method (Albala-Bertrand 1993, Noy 2009, Loayza et al. 2009, Cavallo and Noy 2010, Ahlerup
2013a).
Irrespective of the economic e¤ect of natural disasters, it is plausible to assume that the
fact that a natural disaster takes place at all is a signal of government incompetence in the eyes
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of the electorate, and a shock to the political system. Even a voter that did not blame the
government for the hazardous event that triggered the natural disaster may hold it responsible
for losses incurred and the quality of the relief e¤ort. If so, we should observe a positive link
between natural disasters and the turnover of governments.1
The study closest to the one presented in this paper is Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013). They
explore whether natural disasters are linked to the tenure of individual leaders. The number
of natural disasters is found to have a negative association with leader tenure in autocracies,
but a positive one in democratic countries. Disaster related deaths, on the other hand, are
negatively related to leader tenure in democracies, but not in autocracies. Their explanation is
that democracies invest more in preventive measures, which limit the number of fatalities, since
democratic leaders need to be supported by wider segments of the population. When people do
die in democracies, leaders are punished.2
Cohen andWerker (2008) present a model on disaster prevention and discuss what determines
the optimal level of investment from a governments perspective. Since disasters occur with some
probability only, and then a¤ects only parts of the country, governments, unlike households, will
prefer palliative e¤orts (relief) to preventive e¤ort. Further, the e¤ective level of preparation is
determined by averaging disaster risk over periods with and without disasters and over areas
a¤ected and not a¤ected. A voter a¤ected by a natural disaster is likely to nd little comfort
in the fact that preparations are on an e¢ cient level on average. She may blame the incumbent
administration for insu¢ cient preparations.
A few studies have looked at presidential or mayoral elections in the USA. Abney and Hill
(1966) study the aftermath of a hurricane in Louisiana, USA, in 1965, and its e¤ect on a
mayoral election in New Orleans. They nd that the vote share of the incumbent mayor fell
compared to the previous election, but that the magnitude of the fall was almost identical in
areas a¤ected and areas not a¤ected by the resulting ood. Achen and Bartels (2004) nd that
voters punish the incumbent party in presidential elections in the USA for both droughts and
wet spells. Arceneaux and Stein (2006) study what happened after a ood in Houston, USA, in
2001, and nd that voters are willing to punish the mayor if they viewed the local government
as responsible for (lack of) disaster preparation. Healy and Malhotra (2010) study voting in
USA presidential elections 1952-2004, and nd that incumbents are punished by voters for the
economic damages caused by tornadoes.
In a study of elections in Colombia, Gallego (2012) argues that lethal oods and landslides,
that resulted from the rainy season 2010-2011, beneted mayors belonging to the incumbent
party. The mediating factor is clientelism, as there was an inow of resources to a¤ected areas
that could be used for vote buying.
A more researched topic is the relationship between natural disasters and violent conict.
Natural disasters are typically found to be positively associated with violent conict and social
and political unrest (Olson and Drury 1997, Nel and Righarts 2008, Brancati 2007). It has been
found that some natural disasters are followed by sentiments that constitute political motives
1Clark (2009) studies the e¤ect of valence issues, which are issues on which everyone more or less agree,
including the desirability of less crime, high growth, more honesty, competence, etc., and nds that they have a
signicant impact on party vote shares.
2While this interpretation is appealing, it still leaves open the question why disasters have a positive e¤ect,
rather than a zero e¤ect, on tenure in democracies.
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for rebellion, and a reasonable conjecture is that these also could trigger movements in the
electorate. Examples include when governments are seen as passive in the face of disaster-
induced deprivation, or that relief e¤orts, when such are undertaken, are seen as insu¢ cient and
discriminatory. Governments can be blamed for poor planning and lax enforcement of building
codes, or of subjecting segments of the population to unjust forced relocation (OECD 2004,
Kahl 2006, Schubert et al. 2007, Red Cross 2007).
There are also studies investigating the possible link to democratizing reforms. Brückner
and Ciccone (2011) nd that negative rainfall shocks, which may capture drought disasters, can
create a window-of-opportunity that makes democratization more likely. Ahlerup (2013b) also
nds a positive relationship, but only among countries with an intermediate regime type, and
among countries that already are politically unstable and that receive humanitarian aid.
This paper employs a sample of all country-years between 1976 and 2007 with a competi-
tive direct election of the executive to investigate if natural disasters are related to government
turnover. We take number of steps to minimize the risk for invalid inference. Given the system-
atic di¤erences in reported natural disaster across time and political system (Strömberg 2007),
we are careful to always control for both unobserved heterogeneity and time trends. Our choice
of natural resource indicator is made to limit endogeneity, and we use seismic data to instrument
for geophysical disasters. We are the rst to present evidence that natural disaster can drive
the party of the executive out of o¢ ce.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the data on government change
and natural disasters in Section 2. The empirical framework and results are presented in Section
3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data
2.1 Government change
The Database on Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), contains information on when elections
to the executive have taken place, the ideology of the party of the executive, and the degree
of electoral competitiveness. We code our main dependent variable, Government Change as
Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2012). Government Change is an indicator variable that takes the
value 1 if and only if the ideology of the executive party changes from one year to the next. If
the ideology does not change, it takes the value 0.
Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2012) note how this variable may underestimate change, as the
executive (as individual) can be changed due to lack of popularity even if there is no change
in the composition of the government. They also note that, on the other hand, an indicator of
the change in president or prime minister, comparable to the end of a leaders tenure in Quiroz
Flores and Smith (2013), may overestimate change, as there can be a routine change in prime
minister in an otherwise stable government.
We follow Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2012) and include the following characteristics of the
cabinet in our main specications, all drawn from Beck et al. (2001). Coalition indicates that
the government is formed by more than one political party. Majoritarian indicates whether the
party of the executive controls all relevant houses. Years in O¢ ce indicates the number of years
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the chief executive has been in o¢ ce.
We focus on directly elected executives in countries where elections are competitive, in order
to get as clean a signal of the voters reactions as possible. Beck et al. (2001) provide an
index for the degree of Electoral Competitiveness in executive elections. Our sample consists
of all countries in which there was an election to an executive in a presidential system under
competitive circumstances, which we take to be an Electoral Competitiveness-score of at least 6.
2.2 Natural disasters
We draw our indicators for natural disasters from the Emergency Events Database, EMDAT
(2010), maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). For
each disaster, the CRED includes as reliable information as possible on the number of people
killed, the number of people a¤ected (i.e., in need of direct assistance), and the estimated value of
direct damages.3 These direct losses are not good exogenous indicators of the strength of natural
hazards. Instead, they are reections of the varying vulnerability of human societies. Losses are
ultimately determined by economic, political, and social factors (Kahn 2004, Strömberg 2007),
wherefore it is problematic to use them as indicators in a study that attempt to assess the
impact of natural disasters on some social, economic, or political outcome. A serious problem
with this data is that there are systematic di¤erences in reporting across time, level of income,
and political regimes (Strömberg 2007:201). Additional problems include that data is often
missing, and that continuous variables constructed from loss data are heavily skewed (Ahlerup
2013a).
We use the number of natural disaster events as our natural disaster indicator.4 The main
categories of natural disasters are Biological, Climatological, Geophysical, Hydrological, and Me-
teorological.5 Our variable Natural Disasters refers to the sum of disasters in these categories.
Seismic activity is the ultimate natural force behind earthquakes and behind secondary event,
such as tsunami, and can trigger volcanic eruptions and dry massmovements. Together, these
form the category Geophysical disasters. To instrument for geophysical disasters, we draw data
on the number of seismic events with a magnitude on Richters magnitude scale of 6.5 or more
from Allen et al. (2009). This variable is called M6.5. Seismic events with a magnitude of 6.5
can result in a quite severe disaster, even if also events with lower magnitude has led to reported
3To be included in the database, an event must meet at least one of the following criteria. There are 10 or
more people are reported as killed, at least 100 people are reported as a¤ected, a state of emergency is declared,
or there is a call for international assistance.
4This has some important advantages (adapted from Ahlerup, 2013a), . First, the number of events is a less
skewed variable than indicators of losses are. Second, the number of events is likely to be a less noisy indicator of
the actual number of hazardous events caused by natural forces, than reported losses are of actual losses. Third,
to the extent that political volatility co-determines disaster losses, we have less of an endogeneity problem if we
instead include the count of the number of natural disasters. Fourth, we can use seismic data as an exogenous
instrument to infer a causal link from geophysical disasters to government change. Fifth, even the most serious
natural disasters typically have direct e¤ects on a small fraction of the population. Therefore, it makes sense to
view each natural disaster as an individual shock to the political system.
5Biological disasters include epidemics and insect infestations. Climatological disasters include instances
of extreme temperature (cold waves, extreme winters, or heat waves), wildres, and droughts. Geophysical
disasters include earthquakes, tsunami, volcanic eruptions, dry mass movements (landslides, rockfall, debris ows,
subsidences). Hydrological disasters include oods (ash oods, general oods, mudslides, storm surges, or coastal
oods), and wet mass movements (avalanches). Meteorological disasters include storms (extratropical cyclones,
winterstorms), local storms, and tropical cyclones.
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geophysical natural disaster. A full description of all variables used in the paper, as well as their
sources, can be found in the Appendix.
3 Empirical analysis
The sample consists of 58 countries between 1976 and 2007 in which there was an election to the
executive, for a total of 212 observations. The ideology of the party of the executive changed
in 34 percent of the observations. For reasons outline above, our focus lays on total number
of all types of natural disasters, and on the number of geophysical disasters. On average, each
country had 2.7 natural disasters any given year out of which 0.3 were geophysical, see Table I.
The standard deviations show that there was a wide dispersion around the means. A natural
disaster is reported in three out of four country-years, and a geophysical disaster in one out of
six country-years.
The turn-over rate was higher among countries that experienced a geophysical disaster,
46 percent, than in countries that did not experience a geophysical disaster, 32 percent, and
this drastic di¤erence is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level. Government change was
marginally less frequent in countries that experienced at least one natural disaster (33.5 percent)
than in countries that did not (35 percent), but the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.
[Table I about here]
The dependent variable is binary either there was a change in the ideology in the party of
the executive, or there was not. Models with a binary dependent are generally estimated either
in a linear probability model (LPM) or in a non-linear model, such as Logit or Probit. The
latter have advantages, such as forcing predicted probabilities to fall within the 0 to 1 range and
giving marginal e¤ects that vary over values on the explanatory variables. While non-linearity
has an appeal, we have no a priori reason to expect that any of these non-linear forms are
the correct one. Our choice of empirical model is further guided by our desire to control for
unobserved heterogeneity and to use clustered standard errors, but also to be able to explicitly
address endogeneity. Logit or Probit do not easily lend themselves to the inclusion of both xed
e¤ects and instrument variables. In addition, marginal e¤ects calculated from non-linear models
with xed e¤ects have little meaning, so this particular general advantage of non-linear models
is not relevant here. We therefore opt for the more transparent and versatile LPM framework in
the bulk of the empirical analysis, but test whether the main results hold in non-linear models.
In the multivariate analysis we estimate variants of the following specication,
GovChangeit = + 0Natural Disastersit + x
0
it + t + i + it;
where GovChange is the change in ideology of the party of the executive from t to t + 1 for
country i, Natural Disasters it indicates the number of natural disasters during t, and x is a
vector that includes Polity2 (lagged once), Coalition, Majoritarian, Years in O¢ ce, Log GDP
per Capita (lagged once), and Economic Growth from t  1 to t. t represents time xed e¤ects
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and it is a general error term. Natural disasters are neither completely unpredictable nor truly
random events, even if countries di¤er greatly in their natural vulnerability. In principle, LPM
results could be driven only by between-country di¤erences in disaster exposure and prepared-
ness, rather than within-country variation in the number of natural disasters. To control for
unobserved heterogeneity, we include country xed-e¤ects, i.
Table II presents our main results. More natural disasters implies a higher probability of
government change.6 The result is the same in both LPM and Logit, see Columns 2 and 3.7
The only other consistently signicant variable is the level of democracy (Polity2 ), suggesting
that more frequent turnover is a solid characteristic of more democratic countries. This nding
is in line with Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013), who show that individual leaders are more likely
to be replaced when there are more natural disasters.
All observations in the sample have an election to the executive. When we expand the
sample to countries that do not have a directly elected executive, or where there was not an
executive election, the coe¢ cient for Natural Disasters no longer is signicant (not reported).
This indicates that what we nd here is that the change in government is due to regular voting
e¤ects during election years, rather than through some other mechanism, such as a coup détat.
The di¤erent categories of natural disasters are included separately in Columns 4 to 8.
Government change is more likely after hydrological and geophysical disasters, but not after
biological, hydrological, or meteorological disasters. An argument made in Ahlerup (2013b)
is that these disaster categories di¤er in their degree of endogeneity to societal characteristics
and in the seriousness of losses. Geophysical disasters are ultimately caused by tectonic forces
beyond the control of even the most ambitious government. Hence, a potential explanation
for the pattern in Table II is that disasters with a stronger exogenous component may have a
stronger e¤ect on the likelihood for government change. The pattern of losses is more complex,
but there is no clear indication that the typical level of losses can explain the results in Table
II.8
[Table II about here]
Is the e¤ect of natural disasters the same in countries with weak and strong governments?
One aspect of government strength that merits investigation is whether or not the government is
formed by a coalition of parties. It is not clear a priori whether coalition governments are more
likely to be voted out of o¢ ce when a natural disaster strikes. The need for budget agreements
that please parties with di¤erent agendas suggests that coalition governments may spend less
on disaster prevention. Coalition governments could also be less decisive in their post-disaster
actions due to internal disagreement. On the other hand, more parties in the government means
6All results for Natural Disasters in Tables II and III are robust to the exclusion of observations with many
reported natural disasters (ten or more).
7The results are very similar when user use conditional Logit estimation with standard errors clustered by
country.
8Climatological disasters typically a¤ect a larger fraction of the population and are associated with more
costly damages than other disasters. With the exception of biological disasters, such losses are lower in geo-
physical disasters than in any other type of disaster. The fraction of the population killed is, however, lower in
Climatological and Geophysical disasters. See Table VII in Ahlerup (2013b).
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that it is less clear who is responsible and who is to blame for lack of preparations or relief to
a¤ected individuals and regions.
We split the sample into one where the government is formed by a coalition of parties, and
one where it is not, see Columns 1 and 2 of Table III. Natural disasters are less likely to be
associated with government change in coalition governments. This is consistent with the idea
that government change will be more likely when the burden of blame is more clear to voters.
Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013) nd that individual leaders are less likely to be replaced
after natural disasters in more democratic countries. To explore whether this is the case also for
government parties, we construct an indicator for having a high Polity2 -score (7 or higher), and
include it interacted with Natural Disasters in Column 3. Government change is a less likely in
democratic countries. The size of the coe¢ cient for the interaction term almost matches that
for Natural Disasters, implying that government change after natural disasters is something one
may expect in countries with lower levels of democracy only.9
Direct losses in natural disasters are higher in poor countries, but neither the income level
nor the level of economic growth decides if natural disasters result in a government being ousted
or not. We have tested a wide range of di¤erent specications, and this result seems quite
robust.10 This supports the idea that natural disasters can be seen as individual political shocks
that can inuence the probability for government change.
To investigate whether the actual ideology is a¤ected, we create three variables, Government
Change to the Left/Center/Right, that take the value 1 when the ideology of the executive party
switches to the left, center, or right, respectively. We use these as alternative dependent variables
in Columns 7 to 9 in Table III. Natural disasters are associated only with government changes
to the right. Why this is the case merits further research.
[Table III about here]
There are good reasons to expect endogeneity to be an issue as hazardous natural events are
more likely to become natural disasters in vulnerable environments. Factors such as a lack of
democracy, excessively volatile (or stagnant) political environments, or low income levels, could
a¤ect voting patterns directly, or via other channels. We also have to consider that Natural
Disasters is an imperfect indicator of relevant natural events due to over- or underreporting.
To circumvent the fundamental threat to identication from reversed causality, or simultane-
ity, we instrument for disaster events. The procedure involves rst estimating
[Disaster Indicator]it = 0 + 1M6:5it + x
0
it + t + i + "it;
9We get the same result if we drop Polity2 from the specication or if we set the cuto¤ for Polity2 at 8 instead
of 7. We also get the same result if we split the sample in two, one more democratic and one less democratic.
Natural disasters is signicant only in the latter sample. If we interact Natural Disasters and Polity2 directly,
the interaction term is not signicant.
10We have interacted Natural Disasters with Log GDP per Capita, indicator variables for income levels higher
than the mean, the median, or the 75th percentile, with Economic Growth, growth during the last 3 or 5 years,
or with indicator variables for high or low growth. These interaction terms are never signicant. Splitting the
sample into countries with high or low income or growth never gives conclusive evidence that there is a di¤erence
in the probability for government change.
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where [Disaster Indicator] is an indicator for geophysical disaster(s), and M6.5 it captures seis-
mic events. Seismic events cause earthquakes, tsunami, and dry massmovements, and may trig-
ger volcanic eruptions. Together, they form the category geophysical disasters. Then, observed
[Disaster Indicator] is replaced by predicted [Disaster Indicator] in a second stage,
GovChangeIVit = + 0
\[Disaster Indicator]it + x
0
it + t + i + it:
If the instruments are valid and informative, 0 is consistently estimated.
11
The results presented in Table IV conrm that natural disaster, here geophysical disasters,
can have a causal e¤ect on government turnover. One should be careful not to interpret this as
evidence that there is a causal e¤ect of all types of natural disasters. We need good instruments
for other types of natural disasters in order to support such a claim.
For comparison, Column 1 repeats Column 8 of Table II, and Column 2 presents results
from a Logit estimation.12 Geophysical disasters are instrumented for in Column 3. The rst
stage works well and the second stage estimate is positive and signicant at the 1 percent level.
The estimated coe¢ cient suggest that the true e¤ect on the probability for government change
is higher than what the standard LPM results implied.
[Table IV about here]
As placebo tests we replace M6.5 with the number of seismic events during the year after
or the year before. That this wipes out all signicance from both rst and second stages is
reassuring we are capturing that seismic events a certain year can cause geophysical natural
disasters in that same year, and that this increases the probability that the party of the executive
is voted out of o¢ ce that particular year. To further test the instrument, we restrict the sample
to countries that both experienced at least one seismic event and at least one geophysical disaster
any year in the full 1976-2007 period. We also replace Geophysical Disasters with an indicator
for experiencing at least one geophysical natural disaster. The overall results are conrmed.
4 Concluding Remarks
Natural disasters have recently attracted more attention also among social scientists, and have
been found to be determinants of both economic growth and violent conict. Less is known
about whether they a¤ect how citizens vote in competitive elections. Do they drive government
parties out of o¢ ce? This study nds that they do, but not in highly democratic countries. By
employing seismic data as an instrument, it is established that the relatively strong impact of
geophysical disasters is causal.
11For a general critique on the use of instruments, see Deaton (2010).
12There are 33 observations in the sample with at least one geophysical disaster. All result in Table IV are
robust to excluding all countries with 3 or more geophysica disasters.
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Appendix
Variable Descriptions
Dependent variables
Government Change. Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the ideology of
the executives party changes from 1 January year t to 1 January year t + 1. If the ideology is
unchanged from t to t+ 1, the variable takes the value 0. Source: Beck et al. (2001).
Government Change to the Left. Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the
ideology of the executives party changes to Left from 1 January year t to 1 January year t+ 1.
If the ideology is unchanged from t to t+1, the variable takes the value 0. Coded for countries in
which the ideology of party of the executive 1 January year t is either Center or Right. Source:
Beck et al. (2001).
Government Change to the Center. Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if
the ideology of the executives party changes to Center from 1 January year t to 1 January year
t + 1. If the ideology is unchanged from t to t + 1, the variable takes the value 0. Coded for
countries in which the ideology of party of the executive 1 January year t is either Left or Right.
Source: Beck et al. (2001).
Government Change to the Right. Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the
ideology of the executives party changes to Right from 1 January year t to 1 January year t+1.
If the ideology is unchanged from t to t+ 1, the variable takes the value 0. Coded for countries
in which the ideology of party of the executive 1 January year t is either Left or Center. Source:
Beck et al. (2001).
Political and economic indicators
Coalition. Indicates that the government is formed by more than one political party. The
variable takes the value 0 if only one government party is recorded, and 1 if more than one
government party is recorded. Source: Beck et al. (2001).
Economic Growth. Annual growth rate of Log GDP per capita from year t 1 to t, in percent.
Source. Heston et al. (2009).
Electoral Competitiveness. Executive index of electoral competitiveness. Source: Beck et al.
(2001).
Highly Democratic. Observations with a (lagged) Polity2 -score of 7 or more. Source: Mar-
shall and Jaggers (2002).
Log GDP per capita. The natural log of real gross domestic product per capita, in year 2000
prices. This variable is lagged once when included in the specications. Source. Heston et al.
(2009).
Majoritarian. Takes the value 1 if and only if the party of the executive have an absolute
majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers. If not, the variable takes the value 0.
Source: Beck et al. (2001)
Polity2. The revised combined Polity-score. Possible range is from -10 to 10. This variable
is lagged once when included in the specications. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
Years in O¢ ce. The number of years the chief executive has been in o¢ ce. The variable
takes the value 1 for the year that follows the executives election. Source: Beck et al. (2001).
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Natural disaster indicators
Biological disasters. The total number of biological disasters (epidemics and insect infesta-
tions) reported. Source: EMDAT (2010).
Climatological disasters. The total number of climatological disasters (extreme temperatures,
wildre, and droughts) reported. Source: EMDAT (2010).
D[Geophysical Disaster1]. An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if
Geophysical Disasters is one or more, and 0 if there are zero Geophysical Disasters.
Geophysical disasters. The total number of geophysical natural disasters (earthquake, tsunami,
volcanic eruptions, landslides, rock falls, debris ows, and subsidence) reported. Source: EM-
DAT (2010).
Hydrological disasters. The total number of hydrological natural disasters (ash oods,
general ood, general oods, mudslides, storm surges, coastal oods, and avalanches) reported.
Source: EMDAT (2010).
M6.5. Number of seismic events at time t with a Richters scale magnitude 6.5. Source:
Allen et al. (2009).
Meteorological disasters. The total number of meteorological disasters (storms and cyclones)
reported. Source: EMDAT (2010).
Natural disasters. Number of any type of natural disaster (biological, climatological, hydro-
logical, geophysical, and meteorological) reported. Source: EMDAT (2010).
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Tables
TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
N Mean St.Dev. Min. Median Max
Dependent Variables:
GovChange 212 0.340 0.475 0 0 1
GovChangeLeft 136 0.169 0.376 0 0 1
GovChangeCenter 117 0.068 0.253 0 0 1
GovChangeRight 136 0.140 0.348 0 0 1
Political and Economic Indicators:
Coalition 212 0.363 0.482 0 0 1
Electoral Competitiveness 212 6.830 0.357 6 7 7
Majoritarian 212 0.547 0.499 0 1 1
Polity2 212 4.774 5.296 -8 7 10
Years in O¢ ce 212 7.297 6.337 1 5 38
Economic Growth 212 2.337 5.263 -17.895 2.037 39.597
Log GDP per capita 212 8.488 0.891 6.496 8.547 10.589
Disaster Indicators:
Biological Disasters 212 0.245 0.672 0 0 4
Climatological Disasters 212 0.330 0.895 0 0 10
D[Geophysical Disasters1] 212 0.156 0.363 0 0 1
Geophysical Disasters 212 0.264 0.713 0 0 4
Hydrological Disasters 212 1.009 1.428 0 0 8
Meteorological Disaster 212 0.825 2.859 0 0 27
M65 212 0.255 0.696 0 0 5
Natural Disasters 212 2.675 4.318 0 1 32
TABLE II
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAL DISASTERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable is GovChange
Natural Disasters 0.032** 0.186*
(0.016) (0.109)
Biological Disasters -0.039
(0.047)
Climatological Disasters 0.082***
(0.029)
Hydrological Disasters -0.001
(0.033)
Meteorological Disasters 0.022
(0.018)
Geophysical Disasters 0.202***
(0.068)
Polity2 0.030** 0.035*** 0.335** 0.029** 0.030** 0.030** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.160) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Coalition -0.120 -0.123 -0.654 -0.120 -0.129 -0.120 -0.129 -0.069
(0.098) (0.096) (0.615) (0.098) (0.095) (0.098) (0.098) (0.093)
Majoritarian -0.040 -0.025 0.051 -0.037 -0.046 -0.040 -0.032 -0.028
(0.092) (0.088) (0.751) (0.091) (0.089) (0.092) (0.090) (0.089)
Years in O¢ ce 0.009 0.010* 0.041 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.010* 0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.117) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log GDP per Capita 0.348* 0.302 -0.080 0.346* 0.302 0.349* 0.343* 0.400*
(0.208) (0.210) (2.866) (0.209) (0.211) (0.206) (0.208) (0.210)
Economic Growth 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.062) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 212 212 128 212 212 212 212 212
Countries 58 58 29 58 58 58 58 58
R2 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.11
Notes:
In parenthesis are standard errors, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity in Columns 1, 2, and 4-8. Column
3 reports ordinary standard errors. *** / ** / * indicate p-values below 0.01 / 0.05 / 0.1. In Columns 1, 2, and 4-8
coe¢ cients are e¢ cient for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and clustering on country. Columns 1, 2, and 4-8 are estimated
in linear probability models with GMM. Column 3 is estimated with Logit and reports estimated Logit coe¢ cients. All
specications include country and year xed e¤ects. The sample period is 1976-2007. The full sample consists of all
available country-years where an election to the executive was held in a presidential system with a high degree of electoral
competetiveness (Electoral competetivenes 6).
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